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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent rise of consumer consciousness regarding the health
qualities of foods and beverages has become something akin to
common knowledge. Reflecting this rise, studies reveal that labels
regarding the health qualities of a food are more likely to increase
sales.' And among the health labels consumers prefer, labels de-
scribing the product as natural top the list. One website reports that
according to a recent study, 31.3-percent of respondents thought
that "100% natural" was the best description to read on a label,
compared with only. 14.2-percent who thought that "100% organic"
was the best description.2 "All natural ingredients" was the second
most preferred description; it was preferred by 25.4-percent of re-
spondents. Because it is such a powerful phrase in labeling, how
the term "natural" should be used is a hotly contested issue.
Equally pervasive in consumer food and beverage products is
the use of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), a sweetener found in a
variety of food and beverage products including yogurt, sauces and
condiments, energy bars, and frozen beverage concentrates. Devel-
oped in Japan in 1971, HFCS is cheap to produce, and is six times
sweeter than cane sugar. At a time when cane sugar prices were
artificially high due to trade issues, HFCS became the sweetener of
choice for food manufacturers, and its use has remained wide-
spread.'
In recent years, several lawsuits have been filed contesting the
use of the phrase "natural" on products that contain HFCS. The
common factual basis for the claims is that HFCS is allegedly not
* J.D. Candidate, Spring 2011, University of Arkansas School of Law. The
author thanks Professors Robert B. Leflar and Susan A. Schneider for their re-
markably patient, wise, and candid assistance.
1. Claudia Andre, What's In That Guacamole? How Bates And The Power Of Pre-
emption Will Affect Litigation Against The Food Industry, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227,
254 (2007).
2. John Laumer, US Consumers Prefer "100% Natural" Food Label, TREEHUGGER
(Jul. 3, 2009), http-//www.treehugger.com/files/2009/07/us-customers-prefer-
natural-label-100-organic.php.
3. Id.
4. Jennifer Nelson, High Fructose Corn Syrup: What Are The Concerns?, MAYO
CuNIC (Oct. 23, 2010), http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/high-fructose-corn-
syrup/AN01588; High Fructose Corn Syrup In Foods And Beverages, SWEETSURPRISE,
http://sweetsurprise.com/learning-center/why-is-hfcs-used (last visited Dec. 27,
2010)
5. GREG CRITSER, FAT LAND: How AMERICANS BECAME THE FATTEST PEOPLE IN
THE WORLD 10 (2003).
6. Id. at 11.
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natural, and that by placing the term "natural" on products contain-
7
ing HFCS, defendant-manufacturers are misleading consumers.
The legal theories pursued by plaintiffs upon this factual basis
include violations of state-law consumer fraud and unfair competi-
tion statutes, unjust enrichment, and breach of warranty claims.8
The most common legal defenses used by defendants seeking sum-
mary judgment are preemption and primary jurisdiction.9 This pa-
per focuses exclusively on the former.
According to the author's count, there are presently nine cases
involving the use of "natural" on products containing HFCS that are
being litigated or have been recently decided."o The products in-
volved include granola bars, pasta sauce, iced tea, and juice drinks."
The current hotbeds of this litigation are New Jersey and California.
All of the decisions in cases on this issue were given in 2009 or 2010,
save one, which was given in June 2008.12 This suggests that this
field of litigation is in its infancy, and can be expected to grow.
7. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 2009).
8. Id.; Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1029 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
9. For an explanation of preemption doctrine, see infra, section 2. Though this
paper does not focus on primary jurisdiction, note that several courts have recently
stayed proceedings in "natural" cases based on primary jurisdiction grounds, in or-
der to refer the definition of "natural" to the FDA. However, all of the stays were
temporary, and most have been lifted due to the FDA's express refusal to consider
the issue. See, e.g., Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07-3018, 2010 WL 4065390
(D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2010) (order granting motion to reopen the action); Coyle v. Hornell
Brewing Co., No. 08-2797 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2010) (order dissolving temporary stay).
10. Those cases are: Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir.
2009); Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2009);
Covington v. Arizona Beverage Co., No. 1:08 21894 (S.D. Fla.) (see In re Arizona
Beverage Co. Products Marketing and Sales Practice Litigation, 609 F. Supp. 2d
1369 (J.P.M.L. 2009)); Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., No. 08-2797, 2009 WL
1652399 (D.N.J. June 9, 2009); Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., No. 08cv809, 2009
WL 449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009); Wright v. General Mills, Inc., No. 08cv1532,
2009 WL 3247148 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009); Von Koenig v. Snapple Beverage
Corp., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp.,
No. 07 Civ. 8742, 2010 WL 3119452 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010); Ries v. Hornell Brew-
ing Co., No. 10-1139-JF 2010 WL 2943860 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2010). Additionally,
in 2007, both Cadbury Schweppes and Kraft were threatened with lawsuits regard-
ing "natural" claims on 7Up and Capri Sun drinks, but changed the labels before
the matter was resolved legally. Laura Crowley, HFCS is Natura4 Says FDA in a
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It is the position of the author that the claims being pursued by
plaintiffs in cases on this issue are not preempted by federal law, but
that clarification of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) la-
beling policy and the general curtailment of FDA labeling authority
would best serve consumers. This paper will provide a brief back-
ground on the FDA's authority to regulate food products, followed
by a brief history of litigation on point. It will then provide a brief
overview of current preemption doctrine, and seek to apply that
doctrine to the common factual issues regarding the use of "natural"
on products containing HFCS.1 Finally, it will conclude by encour-
aging greater clarity from the FDA, and a retreat from the agency's
control of labeling in general.
A. FDA Authority to Regulate Food Products
Federal governmental regulation of the food industry began in
earnest with the passing of the Food and Drug Act of 1906, which
permitted regulation of certain labels.14  This authority, initially
given to the Bureau of Chemistry, was expanded in 1912.'1 Then, in
1938, Congress passed the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), which further expanded regulatory authority, and which
formed the basis for the modern incarnation of the FDCA.' Sub-
sequent legislation in 1946 and 1970 revised the FDCA, and in do-
ing so signaled a trend toward consumer protection concerns in
labeling. 7 This trend culminated in the passage of the Nutritional
Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA), the contents of which
form the basis for the legal issue discussed in this comment.
13. Though the immediate focus of this paper is the use of "natural" in relation
to HFCS, its implied preemption analysis reaches the broader issue of the FDA
policy on the use of "natural," and thus may provide useful insight for a broad
range of specific issues under the "natural" umbrella.
14. MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLTCS: How THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES
NUTRITION AND HEALTH 233 (2002). This act is also known as the "Wiley Act." Holk
v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 331 (3d Cir. 2009).
15. Id.
16. Claudia Andre, What's In That Guacamole? How Bates And The Power Of Pre-
emption Will Affect Litigation Against The Food Industry, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227,
230 (2007).
17. Id. at 231.
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B. Survey of Cases
In 2007, Stacy Holk filed a class action claim against Snapple
Beverage Corporation regarding the use of "natural" on its juice
drinks.'8  This claim was dismissed by the district court on the
ground of implied field preemption.'9 That ruling was reversed by
the Third Circuit.20 In the time between the district court Holk rul-
ing and the appellate court Holk ruling, five additional district court
rulings involving the use of "natural" on products containing HFCS
were issued. Of these, two were substantive rulings on motions to
dismiss (which were denied in both cases),2' and three were proce-
dural. There have been numerous rulings since then, but aside
from the district court Holk case, no court that has considered the
issue has found the plaintiffs' claims to be preempted, expressly or
impliedly."
18. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D.N.J. 2008). This
claim was originally filed in New Jersey state court, but was removed to federal
court. See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07cv03018, 2007 WL 4677862
(D.N.J. June 29, 2007).
19. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D.N.J. 2008).
20. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009).
21. In one of these cases, Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., the plaintiff subsequently
decided that she did not want to pursue the case as a class representative, and filed
a motion to amend. In an order dated Nov. 24, 2009, the court gave her 20 days to
file a motion for voluntary dismissal or an affidavit stating that she would pursue
the action as the named plaintiff and class representative. Her final decision is
unknown at this time. Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., No. 08cv809, 2009 WL
4261192 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009).
22. In Wright v. General Mills, Inc., the court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss on the ground of preemption, but granted it without prejudice for plain-
tiff's failure to state a claim. Wright v. General Mills, Inc., No. 08cv1532, 2009 WL
3247148 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009). In Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., the court denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss. Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., No. 08cv809, 2009
WL 449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009). In Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., the court af-
firmed a Magistrate Judge's order denying the defendant's application for a stay of
discovery pending the resolution of the Holk appellate case. Coyle v. Hornell Brew-
ing Co., No. 08-2797, 2009 WL 1652399 (D.N.J. June 9, 2009). In a third ruling, a
judicial panel on multidistrict litigation denied a motion to centralize three separate
actions against Arizona Beverage Co. (one of which was Coyle). In re Arizona Bever-
age Co. Products Marketing And Sales Practices Litigation, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1369
(J.P.M.L. 2009).
23. See supra note 9.
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II. RULES OF PREEMPTION
Preemption occurs when federal law bars the enforcement of
state law requirements. The legal basis for preemption rests in the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides
that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." 24 State law may be preempted expressly
or impliedly."
Express preemption occurs when Congress designates the spe-
cific types of state law requirements that are preempted.2 ' A com-
mon ancillary feature of express preemption provisions is a savings
clause, which specifies what types of state-law requirements are not
preempted by the federal law in question.
Implied preemption may occur in two ways: a.) Implied field
preemption; and b.) Implied conflict preemption. Implied field
preemption occurs when state law regulates "in a field that Congress
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively."2 7 There
are two ways to infer Congressional intent to preempt the field.
One is the presence of a "scheme of federal regulation so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the states to supplement it."2 8 The other is where an Act of Con-
gress touches "a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject."2
Implied conflict preemption can also occur in two situations. It
can occur when it is "impossible for a private party to comply with
both state and federal requirements." Or it can occur when state
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."0' And neither the
absence of express preemption nor the presence of a savings clause
precludes implied conflict preemption. As the Supreme Court in
Geier v. American Honda pointed out, "the saving clause (like the ex-
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
25. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 2009).
26. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006) (example of an express preemption clause).
27. English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
28. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
29. Id.
30. English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
31. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 339 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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press pre-emption provision) does not bar the ordinary working of
conflict pre-emption principles.""
Further, federal statutory law is not the only federal law with
preemptive effect. Federal agency regulations may preempt state
law as well. As the Third Circuit noted, "[w]here Congress has
delegated the authority to regulate a particular field to an adminis-
trative agency, the agency's regulations issued pursuant to that au-
thority have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes."
A. Presumption Against Preemption
The Supreme Court has said that "[c]onsideration of issues aris-
ing under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded
by... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.' "- This assumption operates as a presumption against
preemption. The idea that regulation of food labeling falls within
the province of state regulation dates back to at least 1894, when the
Supreme Court, in Plumley v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, noted
that "[i]f there be any subject over which it would seem the states
ought to have plenary control... it is the protection of the people
against fraud and deception in the sale of food products."
Nor did the advent of the FDCA take regulation of food label-
ing out of the province of state authority. The Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the principle stated in Plumley in a 1963 case.3 8 And in 2009,
the Court specifically rejected an argument that the presumption
against preemption should not be applied to drug labeling - which
is regulated under the FDCA along with food labeling - merely be-
cause the federal government has regulated drug labeling for more
than a century.3 9 Thus, even the century-long tradition of federal
regulation of food labeling under the FDCA cannot take the matter
out of the states' police power.
The practical effect of the presumption is that if a court is faced
with two equally plausible interpretations of a text, it has a "duty to
32. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
33. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009).
34. Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008).
35. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
36. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
37. 155 U.S. 461, 472 (1894).
38. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963).
39. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009).
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accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption."0 0 Further, the pre-
sumption applies not only to the question of whether preemption
exists at all, but also to the question of the scope of preemption.'
III. EXPRESS PREEMPTION
Because the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in
every preemption case, preemption analysis should begin with ex-
press preemption, where Congressional intent is most clearly com-
municated.' Because the state law causes of action examined in this
article involve labeling, the express preemption provision governing
any issues that might arise in connection with the use of the term
"natural" on food and beverage labels is 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a). This
statute, labeled "National Uniform Nutrition Labeling," is the only
express preemption statute in the NLEA, and limits the require-
ments that states can establish as to certain products regulated un-
der 21 U.S.C. § 341 and 21 U.S.C. § 343 . As to these products,
states cannot establish any requirements that are "not identical to"
the requirements already imposed by 21 U.S.C. § 341 and 21 U.S.C.
§ 343 . The exact text of the statute reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or po-
litical subdivision of a State may directly or indirectly establish under
any authority or continue in effect as to any food in interstate com-
merce-
(1) any requirement for a food which is the subject of a standard of
identity established under section 341 of this title that is not identical to
such standard of identity or that is not identical to the requirement of
section 343(g) of this title, except that this paragraph does not apply to a
40. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
41. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
42. Altria v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008).
43. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a) (2006).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(1)-(5) (2006). The FDA has noted that "'[n]ot identical
to' does not refer to the specific words in the requirement, but instead means that
the State requirement directly or indirectly imposes obligations or contains provi-
sions concerning the composition or labeling of food, or concerning a food con-
tainer, that: (i) are not imposed by or contained in the applicable provision (includ-
ing any implementing regulation) of section 401 or 403 of the act; or (ii) differ from
those specifically imposed by or contained in the applicable provision (including
any implementing regulation) of section 401 or 403 of the act." 21 C.F.R. §
100.1(c)(4) (2010). Further, the definitional breadth of the phrase "of the type
required" has not been explicitly defined by courts. While the phrase seems to
encompass requirements of a similar category, and not just of an identical effect or
wording (cf 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006), which seems to suggest a narrower defini-
tional breadth), an authoritative statement of its breadth is impossible at this point.
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standard of identity of a State or political subdivision of a State for ma-
ple syrup that is of the type required by sections 341 and 343(g) of this
title,
(2) any requirement for the labeling of food of the type required by sec-
tion 343(c), 343(e), 343(i)(2), 343(w), or 343(x) of this title that is not
identical to the requirement of such section, except that this paragraph
does not apply to a requirement of a State or political subdivision of a
State that is of the type required by section 343(c) of this title and that is
applicable to maple syrup,
(3) any requirement for the labeling of food of the type required by sec-
tion 343(b), 343(d), 343(f), 343(h), 343(i)(1), or 343(k) of this title that is
not identical to the requirement of such section, except that this para-
graph does not apply to a requirement of a State or political subdivision
of a State that is of the type required by section 343(h)(1) of this title
and that is applicable to maple syrup,
(4) any requirement for nutrition labeling of food that is not identical to
the requirement of section 343(q) of this title, except a requirement for
nutrition labeling of food which is exempt under subclause (i) or (ii) of
section 343(q)(5)(A) of this title, or
(5) any requirement respecting any claim of the type described in sec-
tion 343(r)(1) of this title, made in the label or labeling of food that is
not identical to the requirement of section 343(r) of this title, except a
requirement respecting a claim made in the label or labeling of food
which is exempt under section 343(r)(5)(B) of this title.
Courts and litigants have tended to give little attention to ex-
press preemption in "natural" cases. The defendant in Holk v. Snap-
ple Beverage Corp. did not even raise the issue of express preemption
in the district court.45 Nor did the defendant in Wright v. General
Mills, Inc. Perhaps misunderstanding the law, the defendant in Hitt
v. Arizona Beverage Co. raised an express preemption defense, but
failed to cite a specific express preemption provision that would ap-
ply to the plaintiffs claim." The district court briefs in Lockwood v.
Conagra Foods, Inc. are unavailable, making it impossible to ascertain
how detailed the defendant's arguments on express preemption
were, but the court's opinion gave the topic little attention.8 And
an article in the Journal of Food Law and Policy focusing on the dis-
45. 575 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 2009).
46. No. 08cv1532, 2009 WL 3247148 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009)
47. No. 08cv809, 2009 WL449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009).
48. Regarding the defendant's 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) preemption claim, the court
stated, "[p]laintiffs do not allege that defendant's pasta sauce contains artificial
flavoring, coloring, or a chemical preservative," and thus finding § 343(k) inappli-
cable. Regarding the defendant's 21 U.S.C. § 343(c) claim, the court stated,
"[p]laintiffs are not alleging that the pasta sauce is an imitation of some other
food," and thus found § 343(c) inapplicable.
2010] 243
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trict court Holk and Lockwood decisions devoted only one paragraph
to the express preemption issue.
The above highlighted tendency, which is manifest on all sides
of this issue (court, plaintiff, and defendant), might suggest that ex-
press preemption is not a persuasive defense as to the use of "natu-
ral" in relation to HFCS. Such a suggestion is premature, however,
and does not sufficiently account for the complex issues surround-
ing HFCS and 21 U.S.C. § 343-1.
A. HFCS an Artificial Flavoring?
Snapple's appellate brief in Holk raises an express preemption
argument that future litigants should not ignore. Central to Snap-
ple's argument is 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3), which preempts state law
requirements for the labeling of food that are of the type required
by § 343(k), but that are not identical to the requirements of
§ 343(k). Section 343(k) applies to "artificial flavoring, artificial col-
oring, or chemical preservatives," and states that foods bearing or
containing such components are misbranded unless they bear label-
ing stating that fact.5 1 In its brief, Snapple claimed that the plain-
tiffs argument that HFCS was not "natural" was 'Just another way of
49. Adam Schlosser, A Healthy Diet of Preemption: The Power of the FDA and the
Battle Over Restricting High Fructose Corn Syrup From Food and Beverages Labeled 'Natu-
ral,' 5 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 145 (2009). Schlosser's treatment of express preemption is
not only inadequate as to depth, but he also focuses on the wrong analytical aspect
of the express preemption arguments being made in HFCS cases. Schlosser sug-
gests that because the claims being raised involve the use of the term "natural," and
because the express preemption provision of the NLEA does not mention any FDA
regulation on the term "natural," the claims are not expressly preempted. But the
use of "natural" only encompasses half of the pertinent subject matter in these
suits. The other half is HFCS, which, as the present comment shows, requires a
more thoroughgoing analysis in light of 21 U.S.C. § 343-1.
50. The FDA definition of "food" extends to drinks as well. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f)(1)
(2006).
51. 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) (2006) (emphasis added). Specifically, the statute states
that a food shall be deemed to be misbranded "if it bears or contains any artificial
flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical preservative, unless it bears labeling stating
that fact, except that to the extent that compliance with the requirements of this
paragraph is impracticable, exemptions shall be established by regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary. The provisions of this paragraph and paragraphs (g) and (i)
with respect to artificial coloring shall not apply in the case of butter, cheese, or ice
cream. The provisions of this paragraph with respect to chemical preservatives shall
not apply to a pesticide chemical when used in or on a raw agricultural commodity
which is the produce of the soil." Id.
244 [VOL. 6:235
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saying it is 'artificial.' " Snapple also claimed that HFCS is a "flavor-
ing" within the meaning of 21 C.F.R. § 101.22, which defines flavor-
ing as "any substance, the function of which is to impart flavor."53
The conclusion Snapple was trying to reach is obvious: if a
plaintiff is essentially arguing that HFCS is "artificial," and if HFCS
is a "flavoring," then the plaintiffs claim would seem to be expressly
preempted because it seeks the imposition of a state-law require-
ment of the type required by 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) (i.e. a requirement
about artificial flavoring) that is not identical to § 343(k). Snapple's
position at least highlights the subtlety of the point at issue, but is its
position correct? Leaving aside for now the issue of whether argu-
ing something is not "natural" is just another of way of arguing it is
"artificial," Snapple's argument that HFCS is a "flavoring" raises a
potentially valid point.
1. Is HFCS a "Flavoring"?
The FDA appears to consider HFCS a "nutritive sweetener,"
which may be distinct from a "flavoring." An examination of the
FDA's specific definition of HFCS, found at 21 C.F.R. § 184.1866,
supports this interpretation. There, HFCS is defined as a "sweet,
nutritive saccharide mixture" which must "conform to the identity
and specifications" listed for HFCS in the Food Chemicals Codex, 4"'
Ed.5 The Food Chemicals Codex, in turn, states that the functional use
of HFCS in foods is as a "nutritive sweetener." By adopting the Food
Chemicals Codex identity of HFCS, the FDA appears to consider
HFCS a "nutritive sweetener."" On the surface, the distinction be-
tween "flavoring" and "nutritive sweetener" may appear to be one
without a difference, but FDA regulations contain many otherwise
common phrases that bear a technical definition within the regula-
tions that is different from their vernacular definition. Such is the
case with the terms "flavoring" and "nutritive sweetener."
52. Brief for Defendant/Appelle Snapple Beverage Corp. at 19, Holk v. Snapple
Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-3018); Snapple appeals to 21
C.F.R.
§ 101.22 (2010), which distinguishes "natural flavors" from "artificial flavors," for
support for this argument.
53. 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(a)(1) (2010).
54. 21 C.F.R. § 184.1866(a)-(b) (2009).
55. The FDA website also appears to consider HFCS a sweetener, in a chart that
explains the different functional effects for which ingredients can be added to
foods. Food Ingredients 6f Colors, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
food/foodingredientspackaging/ucm094211.htm (last updated April 2010).
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The technical distinction between these terms is raised in 21
C.F.R. § 170.3(o), where the FDA lists terms that "describe the
physical or technical functional effects for which direct human food
ingredients may be added to foods." Section 170.3(o)(12) defines
"flavoring agents," while § 170.3(o)(21) defines "nutritive sweeten-
ers." These terms are treated as entirely separate technical terms.
But while the terms are treated as entirely separate technical
terms, the two categories are not mutually exclusive, and the precise
effect for which HFCS is added to a food depends in large part on
the manufacturer's intention. According to an FDA representative,
"[t]he properties of HFCS would be compatible with use both as a
nutritive sweetener and as a flavoring, though use as a sweetener is
most common. It is the manufacturer who determines why a sub-
stance is added to food."59
The fact that an ingredient may serve two simultaneous func-
tional effects, combined with the fact that the intended function is
typically determined by the manufacturer, suggests that HFCS could
be considered a "flavoring." However, in most cases the ingredient
labeling requirements established in 21 § C.F.R. 101.4 and § 101.22
do not require an indication of an ingredient's intended use on a
label. The independent and potentially subjective nature of the de-
termination makes a universal declaration of HFCS's functional ef-
56. 21 C.F.R. § 170.3(o) (2009).
57. The FDA is not the only organization to refer to HFCS as a sweetener. The
Corn Refiners Association itself calls HFCS a "corn sweetener." CRA Petitions FDA
for use of "Corn Sugar, " SWEETSURPRISE.COM (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.
sweetsurprise.com/news-and-press/press-releases/corn-sugar-fda-petition. The web-
site sweetsurprise.com, an advocacy site for HFCS, also calls HFCS a sweetener on
its page defining HFCS. What is HFCS? Learn About Sugar, SWEETSURPRISE.COM,
http://sweetsurprise.com/learning-center/what-is-hfcs (last visited Dec. 27, 2010).
Further, in a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court (on an issue unre-
lated to labeling), the primary U.S. manufacturers of HFCS referred to HFCS as
"the primary sweetener in many baked goods and soft drinks. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Dellwood Farms, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1254 (2002) (No.
02-736), 2002 WL 32133638, at *5. Finally, Snapple itself stated that HFCS was a
sweetener in one of its pleadings in the district court Holk case. Reply Memoran-
dum of Law in Further Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First
Amended Class Action Complaint at 33, Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 3:07-
cv-03018, 2007 WL 4677863 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2007).
58. Email from Jeremiah Fasano, Consumer Safety Officer, Food & Drug
Admin., to Josh Ashley, J.D. Candidate 2011, Univ. of Arkansas Sch. of Law (Mar.
17, 2010, 08:06:53 CST) (on file with author).
59. Id. Note that even though HFCS may in particular be both a flavoring and a
sweetener, the FDA has also stated that "[t]he vast majority of flavoring ingredients
used in foods are flavorings only." 56 Fed. Reg. 28,467, 28,599 (June 21, 1991).
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fect very difficult, if not impossible. The plausibility of a claim of
intended effect can vary depending on, inter alia, the quantity used
in the food.0 But even so, most cases would require an examination
of the specific formulation of the food product to determine the
credibility of the intended effect claimed by the manufacturer.6' For
example, with HFCS, a high use level could indicate a nutritive
sweetener function, and a low use level could indicate a flavor func-
tion." Because of the difficulty in determining the functional use in
a specific product, it would be very difficult to refute a manufac-
turer's claimed intended function, and thus a manufacturer could
potentially claim a certain function over another for the purpose of
limiting its liability in a lawsuit. However, the difficulty in determin-
ing HFCS's functional effect as an ingredient does not leave open
the express preemption issue.
2. If HFCS is a Flavoring, is it an Artificial or a Natural Flavoring?
Even assuming HFCS is a "flavoring," it is still not within the
reach of the NLEA express preemption statute. The possibility that
HFCS could be a "flavoring" implicates the distinction between
natural and artificial flavoring raised in 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.22(a)(1)
and 101.22(a)(3). Recall that the express preemption provision be-
ing discussed here applies to artificial, and not natural, flavorings.
In comments to the FDA, the Corn Refiners Association (CRA)
claimed that the production of HFCS involved hydrolysis and enzy-
molysis, and that HFCS thus meets the FDA's definition of "natural
flavor," since it is derived from a vegetable using the prescribed
processes. And at least one news story states that HFCS is pro-
duced by enzymolysis, which seems to buttress the CRA's position."
If HFCS is a "natural flavoring," then the express preemption
provision would not apply. Note, though, that even if HFCS is a
"natural flavoring," this fact would not foreclose the suits at issue
here. Consumers would still be able to argue that HFCS is not natu-
ral for purposes of the state law claims at issue, because a state law
60. Jeremiah Fasano, supra note 58.
6 1. Id.
62. Id.
63. Letter from Corn Refiners Ass'n to the Food and Drug Admin. (Nov. 14,
2006), at 15, available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/06p0094/
06p-0094-c000004-voll.pdf.
64. Jerry DeMarco, Snapple All Natural? Yeah Right, judges Say, EXAMINER.COM
(June 25, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/x-2446-North-Jersey-Crime-Exami-
ner-y2009m6d25-Snapple-all-natural-Yeah-right-judges-say.
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definition of what is "natural" may differ from the technical chemi-
cal definition used by the FDA.
But exactly how strictly the FDA construes the language of 21
C.F.R. 101.22(a)(1) and (3) - particularly the phrase "derived from"
- is unclear, and thus it is possible that HFCS might not meet the
definition of a "natural flavoring," in which case it would seem to be
an "artificial flavoring" by default. However, even if HFCS were
considered an "artificial flavoring," the suits at issue here would still
not be expressly preempted because the statute at issue, 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(k), is a narrow disclosure requirement of a type that would
not preclude the present legal claims.
B. 21 U.S. C. § 343(k) Is A Narrow Disclosure Requirement
Even if HFCS is an artificial flavoring, and thus subject to the
strictures of 21 U.S.C. § 343(k), the nature of the plaintiffs' claims
are not implicated by the statute. The function of § 343(k) is to
mandate a certain required disclosure on the labeling of foods that
contain an artificial flavoring. Specifically, the statute states that a
food is deemed to be misbranded "[i]f it bears or contains any artifi-
cial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical preservative, unless it
bears labeling stating that fact.",6  Based on the plain reading, the
statute requires that if a food contains an artificial flavoring, then
66
the label must disclose that the food contains an artificial flavoring.
Thus, under the plain reading, the disclosure could be as simple as
placing the words "contains artificial flavoring" on the label.
The FDA has codified regulations pertaining to the labeling of
products that contain artificial flavors at 21 C.F.R. § 101.22.67 The
FDA's interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) as revealed in its state-
ments regarding artificial flavors can be accorded considerable
weight because "a major function of § 101.22 is to distinguish be-
tween artificial and natural flavors for purposes of 21 U.S.C. §
343(k)."68 This indicates that the FDA has carefully considered what
is required by § 343(k).
The FDA's interpretation of § 343(k) is revealed by the agency's
paraphrase of 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3), the express preemption provi-
sion. The FDA interprets that statute as a "requirement that the
65. 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) (2006).
66. This reading is supported by the fact that many food labels include the term
"artificial flavor" in the actual ingredient list.
67. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,467, 28,615 (June 21, 1991).
68. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,467, 28,599 (June 21, 1991).
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label states whether a food contains any artificial flavoring, artificial
coloring, or a chemical preservative that is not identical to the re-
quirements of section [343(k)] of the act.",6 The FDA has also stated
that "[t]he act specifically requires in section [343(k)] that when a
food contains any artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical
preservative, the label must state that fact.""o
A specific example of the language required to disclose the
presence of something within the purview of § 343(k) can be found
in the Federal Register. There, the FDA provides an example of
how a sulfating agent should be disclosed:
"If the sulfating agent is directly incorporated in the food as a
preservative, under section [343(k)], the declaration of the pres-
ence of the sulfating agent must be accompanied by an appro-
priate statement of this fact (e.g., 'With (common or usual name
of sulfating agent), a preservative'; 'Contains _ , a preserva-
tive'; or 'to retard spoilage')."0
From this example, it appears that the function of the ingredi-
ent is what must be disclosed. Following the above model, if one
substituted HFCS for a sulfating agent, the examples of required
disclosures would be as follows: "'With high fructose corn syrup, an
artificial flavoring;' 'Contains high fructose corn syrup, an artificial
flavoring."'
Thus, it appears that 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) is a very narrow disclo-
sure requirement that specifically pertains to the disclosure of the
function of the ingredient in the food. And the functions required
for disclosure are those specifically limited to those listed in
§ 343(k); that is, "artificial flavorings," "artificial colorings," and
"chemical preservatives."
The above analysis of § 343(k) reveals why claims regarding the
use of "natural" on products containing HFCS are not preempted by
§ 343(k). Section 343(k) does not pertain to all label disclosures
involving ingredients that could be considered artificial flavorings.
It merely requires that the presence of an ingredient functioning as
an artificial flavoring be disclosed as serving that function. A "natu-
ral" claim on the label of a food containing HFCS is not a claim as
to the function of HFCS as an artificial flavoring in the food. In the
vast majority of cases, the "natural" claim does not pertain to a fla-
voring function at all. But even if the claim pertains to flavoring in
69. 56 Fed. Reg. 60,045, 60,528 (Nov. 27, 1991).
70. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,467, 28,615 (June 21, 1991).
71. 53 Fed. Reg. 50,911, 51,063 (Dec. 19, 1988).
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the sense of a "natural flavoring," § 343(k) is still not applicable, be-
cause § 343(k) only applies to an "artificial flavoring" functioning as
such. Plaintiffs in HFCS cases are not seeking to impose any re-
quirement regarding the labeling of "artificial flavorings," function-
ing as such, that differs from § 343(k).
Further, the plaintiffs in these HFCS cases are attempting to en-
force state law as to what cannot be placed on the label of a food
containing HFCS. Federal law (via § 343(k)) speaks to what must be
disclosed, and speaks to a narrow disclosure." The only way a claim
as to what cannot be placed on a label could run afoul of § 343(k) is
by requiring that an ingredient used to serve a function listed in
§ 343(k) cannot be labeled in accordance with § 343(k). For in-
stance, if HFCS was used as an artificial flavoring in a food, a state
could not require that the term "artificial flavoring" be absent from
the label. The plaintiffs in these cases are in no way seeking such a
requirement. They are merely alleging that the use of the term
"natural" on products containing HFCS violates state law; and these
claims, however they are argued under state law, have no bearing on
21 U.S.C. § 343(k).
C. Court Decisions On Whether HFCS Claims Are Expressly Preempted
Thus far, only one court has explicitly ruled that HFCS claims
are not expressly preempted based on federal law. 3 The Lockwood
court gave minimal attention to the argument, and perhaps focused
attention on the wrong analytical component of the express pre-
emption argument, by simply noting that the plaintiffs did not allege
that defendant's product (pasta sauce) contained an artificial flavor-
72. The Third Circuit stated its support for this interpretation of 21 U.S.C. §
343(k) in Holk, but did not formally enforce its interpretation, because the express
preemption issue was not properly before the court. In a footnote, the court
stated, "[a]dditionally, § 343(k) is a disclosure requirement - i.e., it regulates only
what companies must place on a label. Holk's claims go to what a company cannot
put on a label for the purposes of commercial marketing, an important distinction."
Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d, 329, 336 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009). Further, a
district court adopted Holk's understanding of the disclosure issue in finding ex-
press preemption where a plaintiff did seek to impose disclosure requirements
different from the NLEA. Turek v. General Mills, Inc., No. 09 C 7038, 2010 WL
3527553, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2010).
73. I say "based on federal law," because the court in Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co.
held that the plaintiffs claims were not preempted, but this holding was based on
the fact that the defendants did not reference any express preemption provision at
all, even when making their express preemption argument. No. 08-cv809, 2009 WL
449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009).
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ing." Analytically, the issue of whether plaintiffs explicitly alleged
that defendant's pasta sauce contained an artificial flavor is irrele-
vant. The relevant issue is whether HFCS - which defendant's pasta
sauce contained - is an artificial flavoring. If it is, then plaintiffs are
impliedly alleging that defendant's pasta sauce contains an artificial
flavoring. A plaintiff cannot escape preemption merely by carefully
avoiding certain terms of art and obscuring the underlying issue.
Nevertheless, the court arrived at the correct legal conclusion.
The issue of express preemption of HFCS claims was not prop-
erly before the Holk court but, as noted above, Snapple did make
the argument on appeal, and the court made several observations
about the argument in a footnote. The court noted that "the FDA
appears to consider HFCS a sweetener and not a flavoring, and thus
the allegedly troublesome statute, § 343(k), would be inapplicable."7
The court referred to 21 C.F.R. § 184.1866 and the Food Chemicals
Codex to support its view.7 The Holk court also interpreted 21
U.S.C. § 343(k) to be a disclosure requirement, as discussed above.
IV. SAVINGS CLAUSE
The savings clause contained in the NLEA7 reveals that Con-
gress did not intend the act to preempt the state lawsuits at issue
here:
(1) The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 shall not be con-
strued to preempt any provision of State law, unless such provision is
expressly preempted under section [§ 343-1] of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act.
(2) The amendment made by [section 343-1(a)] and the provisions of
[section 343-1(b)] shall not be construed to apply to any requirement re-
specting a statement in the labeling of food that provides for a warning
concerning the safety of the food or component of the food.
(3) The amendment made by subsection (a), the provisions of subsection
(b) and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection shall not be construed
to affect preemption, express or implied, of any such requirement of a
State or political subdivision, which may arise under the Constitution,
any provision of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act not amended
by subsection (a), any other Federal law, or any Federal regulation, or-
74. Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
75. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2009).
76. Id. The court's interpretation of the functional effect of HFCS conflicts with
the position of at least one FDA representative, and highlights the difficulty of the
"function effect" analysis. See supra, section III.A.1.
77. Id.
78. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1.
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der, or other final agency action reviewable under chapter 7 of title 5,
United States Code."9
Subsection 6(c)(1) directs that the NLEA shall not impliedly pre-
empt state law; the preemption must be express.o Subsection
6(c)(2) directs that the express-preemption provision at section 343-1
does not apply to requirements regarding food safety and compo-
nent warnings. Subsection 6(c)(3) states that subsections 6(c)(1) and
(2) are not to be construed to affect preemption analysis of food
safety and component warnings that arise under any other source of
law. A closer examination of the savings clause supports these con-
clusions.
A. Construction of Subsection 6(c)(1)
First, we must address the exact meaning of subsection 6(c)(1).
The subsection indicates that there can be no preemption based on
the NLEA, except as provided by section 343-1, the express-
preemption provision. This means that practically speaking, no law-
suit based on state law can be impliedly preempted on the basis of
the NLEA."
The way the courts discuss the clause suggests their agreement
with this interpretation. In Holk, a Third Circuit case that consid-
ered whether the plaintiffs state-law labeling claims were impliedly
preempted by the NLEA, the court stated that "courts may not find
implied preemption based on any provision of NLEA."82 The court
also stated that if it were to find implied preemption, it would have
to do so based on federal law other than the NLEA." The way the
court discusses the clause suggests that it takes the first, implied-
preemption-barred, approach to subsection 6(c)(1). In Lockwood v.
Conagra Foods, Inc. a California federal district-court case that also
considered the issue, the court took a slightly stronger stance favor-
ing the approach, noting that the clause "disavows any implied pre-
emption.",4 Finally, in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, a California
state-court case that considered an unrelated NLEA preemption
79. 21 U.SC. § 343-1 note (2006) (Construction).
80. However, implied conflict preemption may apply even when a savings clause
otherwise bars implied preemption. See supra Section II.
81. Note the possible exception of conflict preemption. Supra note 76.
82. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis
added).
83. Id.
84. 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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issue, the court interpreted subsection 6(c)(1) to mean that Congress
made clear that the preemptive scope of section 343-1 was to sweep
no further than the plain language of the statute itself."8 5 These
cases seem to point to a single conclusion in favor of the implied-
preemption-barred approach.
There is, however, an even stronger argument to be made for
the implied-preemption-barred approach based on the statutory lan-
guage itself, interpreted in light of comments made on the Senate
floor upon the adoption of the amendment to the NLEA that intro-
duced the savings clause. While there is no specific reference to
the meaning of subsection 6(c)(1) in the legislative history, refer-
ences to the meaning of subsections 6(c)(2) and (3) are analytically
useful. The pertinent comments are from Senator Orrin Hatch, and
can be accorded considerable interpretive weight because he was a
co-sponsor of the amendment itself.87
The argument focuses on how the phrase "shall not be con-
strued" is used in subsections 6(c)(1) through (3). In subsection
6(c)(1), the statutory language is "shall not be construed to pre-
empt."8" In subsection 6(c)(2), the statutory language is "shall not be
construed to apply to any requirement." 8 9 And in subsection 6(c)(3),
the statutory language is "shall not be construed to affect preemp-
tion."'O The bulk of Senator Hatch's comments concern subsections
6(c)(2) and (3), which pertain to state-law warning requirements (as
applied to content-labeling requirements). In his comments, the
Senator stated that the "uniformity section" (section 343-1) "does
not preempt" state-law warning requirements."' Later, he stated that
"the provisions of [the NLEA] may not preempt a State warning re-
quirement."" Thus, if we compare Senator Hatch's comments with
the wording of the underlying text, we will see that he interpreted
subsection 6(c)(2) to completely bar preemption of state warning
requirements based on the NLEA. But his comments also reveal
that he considers subsection 6(c)(3) to potentially allow preemption
of state warning requirements based on sources of law outside the
NLEA. Speaking of subsection 6(c)(3), he noted, "that very same
[state warning] may be preempted by virtue of . .. another statutory
85. 175 P.3d 1170, 1179 (Cal. 2008).
86. 136 CONG. REc. S18056-01 (1990).
87. Id.
88. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006) (emphasis added).
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. 136 CONG. REc. S16607-02 at S16611 (1990).
92. Id. (emphasis added).
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provision. We may apply his comments to the respective underly-
ing phrases as follows:
"shall not be construed to apply to any requirement" = preemption
barred
"shall not be construed to affect preemption"= preemption not barred
If we interpret subsection 6(c)(1) in light of the meaning given
to the other "shall not be construed" phrases, we are led to the con-
clusion that subsection 6(c)(1) is a complete bar to NLEA-based im-
plied preemption. Subsection 6(c)(1) is much closer in form to sub-
section 6(c)(2), which altogether bars NLEA-based implied preemp-
tion, than it is to subsection 6(c)(3), which leaves the door open to
preemption based on other sources of federal law. Subsection
6(c)(1) states that the NLEA "shall not be construed to preempt."
This is very similar to the subsection 6(c)(2) language, "shall not be
construed to apply." Both suggest a complete bar when compared
with subsection 6(c)(3), where the phrase is "shall not be construed
to affect preemption." The addition of the word "affect" leads to a
more restrained approach than that found in subsections 6(c)(1) and
(2). That these phrases are repeated in such close proximity, in such
a short provision, and yet differ slightly as to wording, suggests that
Congress intended for subsections 6(c)(1) and (2) to have a different
meaning than subsection 6(c)(3).
B. Construction of Subsections 6(c)(2)-(3)
Under this construction of subsection 6(c)(1), the NLEA may
not be used to support an implied preemption defense. Some de-
fendants have therefore preferred to argue that their preemption
defenses derive from portions of the FDCA that were not amended
by the NLEA, and thus fall outside the scope of the protections af-
forded by the savings clause.94 These defendants appeal to subsec-
tion 6(c)(3) of the savings clause, which states:
The amendment made by subsection (a), the provisions of subsection (b)
and paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection shall not be construed to
affect preemption, express or implied, of any such requirement of a
State or political subdivision, which may arise under the Constitution,
any provision of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act not amended
by subsection (a), any other Federal law, or any Federal regulation, or-
93. Id.
94. For example, in Lockwood, the defendant based its preemption argument on
FDA "misbranding" regulations. Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d
1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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der, or other final agency action reviewable under chapter 7 of title 5,
United States Code.95
They argue on the basis of subsection 6(c)(3) that the limited nature
of preemption in the NLEA and savings clause may not be used to
infer a lack of congressional intent to preempt when the defendants'
preemption arguments arise under other parts of federal law. In
such cases, the argument goes, the NLEA and subsections 6(c)(1)
and (2) may not be used to affect the preemption analysis pertaining
to other federal law.
Thus, the effect of the savings clause on implied preemption
defenses based on portions of federal law other than the NLEA is
also important, and is informed by subsections 6(c)(2) and (3). Sub-
section 6(c)(2) states that 21 U.S.C. §§ 343-1(a) and (b) (the express
preemption provisions) do not apply to food-safety and component-
warning requirements. Subsection 6(c)(3) states that subsections
6(c)(1) and (2) are not to be construed to affect preemption analysis
"of any such requirement" that arises under any other source of law.
Taken together, subsections 6(c)(1) and (2) do not support the de-
fendants' argument.
A plain reading suggests two possible effects of the savings
clause on implied-preemption arguments based on portions of fed-
eral law outside the NLEA. One, the NLEA is barred from having
any effect on preemption analysis at all. This is the broader reading.
Or two, the clause is only barred from having an effect on preemp-
tion analysis pertaining to state-law food-safety and component-
warning requirements. This is the narrower reading. How one in-
terprets subsection 6(c)(3) will dictate which possibility is correct.
Defendants prefer the broader reading because under it, if a
defendant grounds its preemption argument in portions of the
FDCA outside the NLEA, the court cannot use the NLEA or the
savings clause to infer a lack of intent to preempt in the food-and-
beverage-labeling field. For example, in Lockwood v. Conagra Foods,
Inc., the court reasoned that "the existence of a savings clause which
explicitly disavows any implied preemption with certain subject ar-
eas [i.e. those covered by the NLEA] suggests that Congress did not
intend to occupy the field of other related subject areas."96 This kind
of reasoning would be prohibited under possibility one, because
under it, the savings clause in the NLEA cannot be construed to af-
95. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 note (2006).
96. 575 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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fect preemption outside the NLEA in any way. However, Congress
seems to have intended the narrower reading.
The decisive interpretive issue is the meaning of the phrase
"any such requirement" in subsection 6(c)(3). If the phrase refers to
the state-law warning requirements mentioned in subsection 6(c)(2),
then the narrow reading is correct. If the phrase has a more general
meaning, and refers to any state-law requirement that concerns any
of the specified provisions of federal law, then the broader reading
is correct. Senator Hatch's comments on the amendment make it
clear that the phrase refers to the state law warning requirements in
subsection 6(c)(2). Speaking of subsection 6(c)(3), the Senator said:
Specifically, the uniformity amendment has two components. First, it
states that the carefully crafted uniformity section of this legislation is
limited in scope. That section does not preempt or affect a requirement
respecting a statement in the labeling of food that provides for a warn-
ing concerning the safety of a food or a component of a food. An exam-
ple of such a warning would be a statement required under a state law
regarding the possibility of an allergic reaction from a component of a
food. Perhaps more important is the second rule of construction em-
bodied in [subsection 6(c)(3)], which makes it abundantly clear that the
lack of preemption of such warning requirements in the legislation is
not extrapolated, through overzealous statutory interpretation, to imply
that preemption of such warning requirements is somehow affected by
the enactment of limited preemption in this legislation. Specifically, the
amendment provides that the bill" does not affect preemption, express
or implied, of any State or local warning requirement which arises under
the Constitution, any other provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, any other Federal law, or any regulation, order or other
final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.
In Senator Hatch's own paraphrase of subsection 6(c)(3), he
substitutes the phrase "any State or local warning requirement" for
the phrase "any such requirement," found in the actual amendment.
This substitution indicates that the phrases are equivalent. It should
be noted that Senator Hatch made a statement immediately follow-
ing the one above that leaves open the possibility of his preference
for the broader approach. He said, "[t]he decision of Congress in
this legislation to specifically preempt certain State or local re-
quirements is not evidence, one way or the other, of any Congres-
sional view about the existence of preemption which may arise from
other existing legal authorities or actions."98
But the above statement occurred in the immediate context of
his comments on state-law warning requirements, which suggests
97. 136 CONG. REc. S16607-02 at S16611 (1990) (emphasis added).
98. Id.
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that he had those requirements in mind when he made the state-
ment. And because he said nothing about the type of requirements
outside the NLEA that may sustain a preemption defense, we may
be reasonably confident that he is still speaking within the "state
warning requirements" frame of reference.
Further, this narrower reading is supported by Lockwood.
There, the court noted that a fair reading of the phrase "any such
requirement" in subsection 6(c)(3) is one that interprets the phrase
as referring to the topic of food-safety or component warnings in
subsection 6(c)(2).99 The court did not refer to any legislative his-
tory in making this observation, so we may assume this to be its
plain reading of the clause.
Taken together, these indications from the statute itself and
from the case law and legislative history show that the there is no
implied preemption based on the NLEA, but that the NLEA may be
used to infer a lack of preemption when defendants raise preemp-
tion defenses that arise out of other sources of federal law.
V. IMPLIED FIELD PREEMPTION
A. What is the Field?
Because the claims involving HFCS in products labeled "natu-
ral" are fundamentally about labeling, any implied field preemption
arguments must derive from the field of food and beverage labeling.
Some defendants have preferred to argue that their preemption
defenses derive from portions of the FDCA that were not amended
by the NLEA.'00 However, even these portions involve food and
beverage labeling.
B. Preemption Defenses Under the NLEA
As noted above, defendants in HFCS litigation have preferred
to ground their preemption arguments in portions of the FDCA not
amended by the NLEA.'0 ' The reason should be obvious based on
99. Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
100. See supra, note 94.
101. Defendants' primary way of arguing that plaintiffs' claims fall outside the
scope of the NLEA is to argue that the claims are basically misbranding claims un-
der the FDCA. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 337 (3d Cir. 2009);
Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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the analysis of the savings clause above: the NLEA savings clause,
§ 6(c)(1), bars implied preemption based on claims arising under the
NLEA. However, claims involving the use of "natural" on products
containing HFCS do fall within the NLEA, and therefore are not
preempted unless expressly preempted by 21 U.S.C. § 343-1, or
through conflict preemption.
The FDA policy on the use of the term "natural" is a central
part of the analysis of claims involving the term's use on products
containing HFCS. This being the case, the law under which the
FDA has undertaken the development of its position on the use of
the term "natural" should be given great weight in determining
whether the claims alleged fall under the NLEA or portions of the
FDCA outside the NLEA.
The Lockwood court recognized this argument, and its import,
and came to the following conclusion:
[W]hen the FDA considered whether to adopt formal regulations defin-
ing the use of the term 'natural' on food labels it did so pursuant to the
NLEA amendments to the FDCA - not the FDCA provisions left un-
touched by the NLEA. See 58 F.R. 2302-1 (1993) ("This action is part of
the food labeling initiative of the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices (the Secretary) and in response to the Nutrition Labeling and Edu-
cation Act of 1990 (the 1990 amendments)."). In other words, if the
FDA were to adopt formal regulations defining the use of 'natural' on a
food label, it would do so pursuant to the NLEA - the very act that un-
ambiguously provides that there is no preemption of state laws except as
expressly provided.o2
Thus, there is a strong argument that the claims involving the use of
the term "natural" do arise under the NLEA, because the FDA's pol-
icy on the term has been developed under the NLEA. If this argu-
ment is correct, then the claims are not subject to implied field pre-
emption, and cannot be, because of the savings clause.
C. Preemption Defenses Under the FDCA Generally
Though there is a strong case to be made that claims involving
the use of the term "natural" on labels fall within the NLEA and
therefore cannot be impliedly preempted, even if the claims fall out-
side the NLEA, they are still not impliedly preempted based on FDA
regulation in the food-and-beverage labeling field. As noted above,
because regulation of health and safety issues generally, and food
and beverage labeling in particular, have traditionally been areas of
102. Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
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state regulation, Congressional intent to supersede state law in the
field must be "clear and manifest."03 Contrary to being clearly and
manifestly intended to supersede state law in the food-and-beverage
labeling field, Congressional activity and FDA regulation strongly
appear to envision and permit simultaneous state law in the field.
1. Inference Drawn from Express Preemption Provision
The first and primary indicator of Congressional intent to allow
for state regulation in the food-and-beverage labeling field is the
NLEA express savings clause. The NLEA is part of the FDCA's food
and beverage labeling provisions. Therefore, we may infer Congres-
sional intent as to the field by looking at the NLFA itself.10 4
The Supreme Court has noted that "an express definition of the
pre-emptive reach of a statute 'implies' - i.e., supports a reasonable
inference - that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other mat-
ters."' 5 The express preemption clause at 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 is just
such an express definition of preemptive reach. And while the
Court has also noted that an express definition of preemptive reach
"does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses any possi-
bility of implied pre-emption," the inference, combined with other
sources of Congressional intent, suggests that Congress did not in-
tend to preempt state-law claims of the type at issue here.'r
The reasoning behind the non-preemption inference drawn
from express preemption clauses was summarized by the Holk court
in a paraphrase of the plaintiffs argument: "[the plaintiff] reasons
that the limited nature of the express preemption provision in
NLEA, which applies only to those federal laws specifically enumer-
ated, 'would serve no purpose and would simply be surplus if Con-
gress had intended to occupy the entire field of food and beverage
labeling.""' The idea, which the plaintiff argued correctly, is that if
the field of food and beverage labeling were already dominated by a
pervasive scheme of federal regulation that left no room for state
103. English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); Holk v. Snapple Bev-
erage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 2009).
104. Recall that, as shown above, the express savings clause in the NLEA fore-
closes consideration of the NLEA only as to preemption of warning requirements
that arise under other sources of law. Because warning requirements are not the
subject of the current analysis, the NLEA may be considered in analyzing the pre-
emption of the labeling claims at issue here.
105. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995).
106. Id.
107. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d. 329, 337 (3d Cir. 2009).
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regulation, a limited express-preemption provision would be unnec-
essary, because every state law requirement in the field would already
be preempted.
The California Supreme Court, in In re Farm Raised Salmon
Cases, advanced another persuasive argument for inferring the lack
of implied preemption based on the express preemption statute.
The court said:
Various provisions of the FDCA clearly demonstrate that "Congress
knows how to write a preemption clause" when it wants to (Consumer
justice, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 749) and that
"the [FDCA] evidences, far from implied preemption, an instance of
implied non preemption." (Id. at p. 1063, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 749.) Con-
gress enacted numerous specific express preemption provisions in the
FDCA. (See, e.g., §§ 360k (medical devices), 360ss (radiation emissions),
379r (nonprescription drugs), 379s (cosmetics).) The inference to be
drawn from these provisions is that Congress, in light of the history of
dual state-federal cooperation in this area, did not intend to limit states'
options in a broad fashion. Indeed, the preemption provision at issue
here, section 343-1, demonstrates Congress's care in deciding what to
preempt and what to allow. Section 343-1 is notable both for the num-
ber of misbranding provisions it deals with (approximately 20) and for
the detailed nature of its preemptive scope. The language of section 343-
1 and the NLEA's express preemption provision is further evidence that
Congress chose carefully the manner with which it preempted certain
state labeling laws."
2. Other Expressions of Congressional Intent
There is also ample evidence that Congress was well aware of
the existence of the regulatory roles played by the states prior to the
enactment of the NLEA, and that Congress intended to preserve
those roles while enacting the NLEA. The sponsor of Amendment
3125 (discussed above), Senator George Mitchell, commented on
the balancing of state and federal roles sought in the NLEA. The
Senator noted that "[i]t is also important that [the NLEA], which
requires nationally uniform nutritional labeling, is sensitive to the
regulatory roles played by the States. This bill has been refined to
provide national uniformity where it is most necessary, while other-
wise preserving State regulatory authority where it is appropriate.,"'09
This statement suggests exactly the type of tension the Supreme
Court was concerned about when it said "[t]he case for federal pre-
emption is particularly weak where Congress has indicated its
108. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170 (Cal. 2008).
109. 136 CONG. REc. S16607-02, 16609 (1990).
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awareness of the operation of state law in fields of federal interest,
and has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to toler-
ate whatever tension there [is] between them.""o
VI. CONFLICT PREEMPTION
Claims regarding the use of HFCS in products labeled "natural"
are not preempted by implied conflict preemption. They are not
preempted due to the impossibility of compliance with state and
federal requirements, and they are not preempted by raising an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of Congress.
A. Impossibility
The claims in question are not preempted due to the impossi-
bility of dual compliance because, as the Lockwood court noted, "[a]
manufacturer could comply, that is, not violate the FDA's policy as
to use of the term 'natural' and still comply with state law as articu-
lated by plaintiffs in this case."' The claims being brought basically
allege that, under state law, products containing HFCS should not
be labeled "natural," because HFCS is not natural. Manufacturer
defendants can physically comply with the requirements of state law,
as alleged, and FDA policy. Because the state law requirements al-
leged by the plaintiffs in HFCS cases are arguably more restrictive
than the FDA's policy on "natural," defendants' compliance with the
state law requirements would pose no conflict to their compliance
with the less restrictive FDA policy. Further, in the Holk appellate
case, Snapple did not even raise impossibility of dual compliance as
a conflict preemption defense."'
B. Obstacle
Nor are the claims in question preempted because the state law
requirements they seek to enforce stand as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment of the objectives of Congress. The purpose and ob-
110. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. 141, 166-167 (1989). However, food and bever-
age labeling is not necessarily a "field of federal interest," given the historic food
safety regulatory roles played by the states.
111. Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1034 (N.D. Cal
2009).
112. Brief for Defendant/Appellee Snapple Beverage Corp., Holk v. Snapple
Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-3060), 2009 WL 383336.
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jectives of Congress regarding the use of "natural" may be discerned
though the FDA's regulation of the use of the term, because of the
authority delegated to the FDA by Congress. Thus, to determine
whether any state law requirements alleged by the plaintiffs pose an
obstacle to Congressional purpose, one must determine whether the
FDA's regulation of the use of "natural" evidences any particular
purpose that is entitled to preemptive effect. This purpose, if it ex-
ists, must be manifested in law. As one court noted, "it is federal
law which preempts contrary state law; nothing short of federal law
can have that effect.""' The reasoning behind this idea is that if
there is no federal purpose, there is nothing with which state law
can conflict, and thus no conflict preemption. To this end, the FDA
has noted that "[i]f there is no applicable Federal requirement that
has been given preemptive effect by Congress, there is no compet-
ing claim of jurisdiction, and, therefore, no basis under [the NLEA]
for Federal preemption."' 14
Various courts have rightly determined that the FDA has not
evidenced such a preemptive purpose through law. The Holk court
put it thus: "[T]here is no conflict preemption in this case because
there is no FDA policy with which state law could conflict.""
In determining whether a federal pronouncement is entitled to
preemptive effect, courts focus on the process by which the decision
is arrived at. For example, in a Third Circuit case, the court de-
clined to "afford preemptive effect to less formal measures lacking
the 'fairness and deliberation' which would suggest that Congress
intended the agency's action to be a binding and exclusive applica-
tion of federal law."" 6 That court also said that "[c]ourts with good
reason are wary of affording preemptive force to actions taken un-
der more informal circumstances.""'7 This reflects a desire to limit
preemption to those instances in which Article VI of the Constitu-
tion truly applies; that is, where it is really the "supreme law of the
land" that is doing the preempting. But it also reflects a policy de-
sire. Thus, the Third Circuit noted:
Regularity of procedure - whether it be the rulemaking and adjudicatory
procedures of the APA or others which Congress may provide for a par-
113. Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (em-
phasis original).
114. 56 Fed. Reg. 60,528, 60,530 (Nov. 27, 1991).
115. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 342 (3d Cir. 2009).
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ticular purpose - not only ensures that state law will be preempted only
by federal 'law,' as the Supremacy Clause provides, but also imposes a
degree of accountability on decisions which will have the profound ef-
fect of displacing state laws, and affords some protection to the states
that will have their laws displaced and to citizens who may hold rights or
expectations under those laws."'
The FDA has not issued any policy statements on the use of
"natural" that meet the standards outlined above. The FDA does
not have a formal policy on the use of the term "natural." When the
FDA referenced its policy in a Federal Register statement in 1991,
the FDA referred to the policy as "informal.""" In the same Register
statement, the FDA said that the use of the term on labels was "of
considerable interest to consumers and industry," and noted that it
was considering establishing a definition for the term.o20 In fact, the
FDA stated that if an adequate definition of the term were estab-
lished, "the ambiguity surrounding use of the term that results in
misleading claims could be abated."'2' This shows that the FDA was
aware of the precise problem raised by the litigants in HFCS cases
today. And yet, even though the FDA recognized this problem, it
"decided not to define the term."' 2 Further, the FDA recently de-
nied a specific request by several federal district court judges to de-
termine whether HFCS qualifies as "natural."'23 Recognizing the
problem resulting from the lack of a definition of "natural" and con-
sciously abstaining from a rulemaking regarding the term suggests
that the FDA, and therefore Congress, does not have the "purpose"
to regulate the term's use. 2 1
118. Id.
119. 56 Fed. Reg. 60,421, 60,466 (Nov. 27, 1991).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2397 (Jan. 6, 1993).
123. See, e.g., Coyle v. Hornell Brewing Co., No. 08-2797 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2010)
(order dissolving temporary stay) (the letter from the FDA denying the judge's re-
quest is attached to the order).
124. Nor does the absence of regulation evince a Congressional purpose. The
Supreme Court, in Spietsma v. Mercury Marine, noted that mere absence of regula-
tion cannot be given preemptive weight as an agency's determination not to regu-
late, without an "'authoritative' message" that the absence is intended as such. The
Court said "although the Coast Guard's decision not to require propeller guards
was undoubtedly intentional and carefully considered, it does not convey an "au-
thoritative" message of a federal policy against propeller guards." Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 67 (2002). This is parallel to the FDA's actions here.
The FDA's decision not to define "natural" was carefully considered, but it does not
convey an authoritative message of a federal policy against any definition of the
term, as evidenced by the very existence of an informal policy. Id.
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Nor does the informal policy on "natural" sustain preemptive
authority based on a fair process analysis. The Holk court rightly
pointed out that the fact that the FDA requested comments on the
term's use "in reaching a decision on any future FDA course of ac-
tion" implies that the agency's informal policy pre-dated a request
for notice and comment. 2  And, noted the Holk court, "[b]ecause a
search of the Federal Register results in neither earlier references to
this policy nor other requests for comments on the use of the term
'natural,' the record demonstrates that the FDA arrived at its policy
without the benefit of public input.",26 This suggests that the FDA's
current informal policy was arrived at in a way that falls far short of
the requisite "fairness and deliberation" that courts have looked for
in other preemption contexts.
Further, the FDA did not respond to all of the comments it re-
ceived. The agency noted one comment that it considered "moot"
in light of its decision not to define the term.'2 7 And even after dis-
cussing several comments, the agency said that "there are many fac-
ets of this issue that the agency will have to consider if it undertakes
a rulemaking to define the term." 2 ' This illustrates an incomplete
consideration of all the facets of the issue, and an admission that the
agency will have additional issues to consider before making a final
rule. Again, as Holk recognized, all of these facts indicate a lack of
the "fairness and deliberation" required for the FDA policy to have
preemptive effect.
Finally, an agency letter authored by the FDA proclaiming
HFCS to be "natural" is not entitled to preemptive effect. In April
2008, FoodNavigator-USA.com published an article that quoted an
FDA representative as saying HFCS would not comply with the
agency's policy on "natural."'29 Then on July 3, 2008, the same FDA
representative said, in a letter to the Corn Refiners Association, that
the FDA would consider HFCS to meet the agency's policy on "natu-
125. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 341; 56 Fed. Reg. 60,045,
60,467 (Nov. 27, 1991).
126. Id.
127. 58 Fed. Reg. 2125, 2397 (Jan. 22 1991).
128. 58 Fed. Reg. 467, 2407 (an. 6, 1993) (emphasis added).
129. Laura Crowley, HFCS is Natura Says FDA in a Letter, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA
(July 8, 2008), http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Financial-Industry/HFCS-is-
natural-says-FDA-in-a-letter.
264 [VOL. 6:235
A BITTERSWEET DEAL FOR CONSUMERS
ral," depending on how the HFCS is made. 30 However, this letter
cannot be accorded preemptive weight. 3'
The court in Fellner stated, "we have found no case in which a
letter that was not the product of some form of agency proceeding
and did not purport to impose new legal obligations on anyone was
held to create federal law capable of preemption."132 The letter does
not even appear to constitute an advisory opinion, which itself may
not operate as a legal requirement.33
VII. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the legal merits of state-law claims that HFCS is
not "natural," the claims themselves are not preempted by federal
law. Even without applying the presumption against preemption,
the claims are neither expressly nor impliedly preempted. Applying
the presumption, the lack of preemption is even clearer. However,
there are serious problems with the current regulatory structure that
should be addressed.
If the FDA is going to claim control over food-and-beverage la-
beling standards, the agency should create a more objective method
for determining the functional effect for which ingredients are
added to foods and beverages. The opacity of this determination
regarding HFCS is not unique to that particular ingredient. The
vast implications for litigation portended by 21 U.S.C. § 343(k), and
thus the importance of distinctions regarding the functional effects
of ingredients, are enough reason to undergo a rulemaking to de-
velop a more objective and predictable method of distinction. Con-
sumers should not be forced to hire a food chemist or commence
litigation in order to determine the functional effect of an ingredi-
ent.
However, the FDA has illustrated its inability to serve the inter-
est of consumers and manufacturers on the "functional effect" issue,
and labeling issues more broadly. A better approach would be to
leave all labeling requirements up to the states via consumer fraud
litigation. That way, consumers would be their own judges regard-
130. Letter from the Food and Drug Admin. to Corn Refiners Ass'n (July 3,
2008), available at http-//www.corn.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/FDAdec-
ision7-7-08.pdf (emphasis added).
131. Apart from any other legal consideration, the fact that the agency's view is so
vacillating weighs against according either of these letters authoritative weight.
132. Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
133. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(j) (2010).
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ing what their interests in labeling are, and how to protect them,
through the courts and the jury system. This would result in a more
efficient use of economic and bureaucratic resources, and more ac-
curately reflect the issues that consumers are concerned with, rather
than forcing consumers and industry to expend exorbitant sums
merely to address the regulatory hurdles that encumber litigation in
the current system, on top of the costs of litigating the underlying
issues. Federal encroachment on the states' police powers in the
labeling field has left confusion and stagnation in its wake. The fed-
eral leviathan has certainly bitten off more than it can chew. But,
unfortunately, when it comes to the issue of "natural" labeling
claims, it is the consumer who is choking.
Public interest in "natural" claims and HFCS shows no sign of
abating anytime soon. The current regulatory structure, while not
preemptive as to the state-law claims examined in this comment,
should be clarified, if not abolished. The right changes will restore
consumer confidence in food and beverage labeling by creating
greater clarity and simplifying civil legal enforcement.
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